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Management of the United States-Japan Trade Relationship 





The United States-Japan trade relationship is of major importance 
to both countries, to the other economies of the Pacific Basin, and to 
the world economy and its international trading system. While 
providing immense economic benefits, it has also generated increasing 
bilateral tension and contentious friction to a degree which has profound 
implications bilaterally, regionally, and globally. The trade relation-
ship has become highly politicized in both countries, especially the 
United States, and increasingly difficult to manage effectively at the 
governmental level. 
The fundamental issues are: will the ways in which the United 
States and Japan handle their own economies and particularly the 
bilateral tensions in trade bring down the international trading system 
as we know it, or less extremely transform it in major ways to a sub-
stantially less open system? Will the United States, Japan, the Pacific 
Basin region, and indeed the world economy sink either into recession or 
head into substantial inflation, or first recession and then inflation in 
reaction? 
This is a short paper, the goals of which are nonetheless comprehensive. 
It focuses on the three main dimensions of the U.S.-Japan trade relation-
ship: macroeconomic, namely the overall immense respective trade and 
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current account deficits and surpluses; microeconomic, namely sectoral 
issues of American business access to Japanese markets (and, less marred 
by bilateral frictions but of systemic importance, the nature of restric-
tions of Japanese access to U.S. markets); and systemic, namely the way 
in which the resolution of bilateral trade issues affect the rules of 
the game and nature of the GATT-based, multilateral, relatively open 
international trading system. I briefly assess recent trends and their 
causes, current policy issues and actions, and draw important implications. 
In the final section I consider the effects on other Pacific Basin 
economies; that discussion in relevant for the world as a while though 
the management of the U.S.-Japan trade relationship has a particularly 
large Pacific Basin impact* 
The importance of the trading relationship lies not simply in its 
huge size — after all U.S.-Canada trade is substantially greater though 
for Japan the United States is by far its largest trading partner — but 
also in its nature. There are two major economic factors. First, 
Japanese firms have become the dominant competitive challenges to 
American firms in a number of major industries — first textiles, then 
steel, automobiles, and now semiconductors and potentially other civilian 
goods high technology sectors. American problems of structural adjust-
ment have been severe, and major politically powerful industries have 
been able to use the political process to prevent a purely market-
determined solution. 
Second, Japan by virtue of its economic size (second largest market-
economy GNP since the early 1970s), attainment of the technological 
frontiers in manufacturing, and high standard of living — having "caught 
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up with the West" economically and technologically by the late 1970s — 
is an economic power second only to the United States. As such it 
has not only a major stake in maintaining the open international trading 
system but a major responsibility to assure that the system is 
strengthened and expanded, not weakened. This is the key issue of the 
leadership role of Japan as a major economic power. 
Perhaps not surprisingly, discussion focuses on the problems and 
frictions in the bilateral trading relationship while the actual benefits 
accruing to individuals and companies in both countries tend to be taken 
for granted or downplayed. We should not forget that consumers have a 
greater variety of goods, and at lower prices, to select from. Producers 
and marketers using imported components, OEM products, or intermediate 
imports similarly benefit. Long-run economic performance in both 
countries has been enhanced by the spur of competition and more efficient 
resource allocation; export producers have benefitted from growing 
markets. The main losers, far larger and more noticeable in the United 
States than in Japan, have been domestic producers facing severe 
competition from Japanese (and other, especially Pacific Basin) imports. 
The domestic politics of trade pit highly organized domestic producers 
facing import competition (workers, managers, and owners in steel, 
automobiles, textiles in the U.S.; farmers, small-scale retailers, and 
those in textiles, aluminum and similar uncompetitive sectors in Japan) 
against diffuse consumers who count very indirectly if at all in the 
practical politics of the management of the U.S.-Japan trade relationship 
and against somewhat better organized export producer interest groups 
(especially in Japan). 
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There are two further dimensions which add to the importance and 
also the complexity of the economic relationship. First, the newly 
emerging bilateral financial relationship inevitably will have to have a 
major impact. The United States has already become the world's largest 
debtor nation, and Japan the largest creditor, and more than two-thirds 
of Japanese credits are in American (or at least dollar-denominated) 
assets. Inevitably the rise of these respective net debtor and creditor 
positions, and Japanese net (portfolio and direct) investment will 
increase dramatically in the next five years, in ever more complex 
patterns and with new and special particular problems for the management 
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of the U.S.-Japan relationship. Second, the United States and Japan 
have a security treaty of great importance to both nations. This 
security relationship of necessity frames the environment within which 
economic issues between the two countries are dealt with. In many 
respects the bilateral relationship is a symbiotic alliance with its 
core built upon the three pillars of security, trade, and, increasingly, 
finance and capital flows. 
The United States and Japan are the dominant economic forces in 
the Pacific Basin by virtue of their economic sizes, technological 
capabilities, trading patterns, and roles in determining and maintaining 
the rules of the game of the trading system. Not only U.S. and Japanese 
economic performance and policies, but the ways in which the bilateral 
relationship is managed strongly affect the other Pacific Basin economies 
— to their advantage or to their disadvantage. In general, bilateral 
negotiations to open markets, notably the Japanese, benefit the others 
though probably not as much as multilateral negotiations would since 
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reduction of barriers focuses particularly on American interests. 
Bilateral negotiations to restrict Japanese access to the American market 
— essentially for reasons of injury and to ease structural adjustment 
whatever mechanisms may be used — can spill over adversely or 
beneficially to other Pacific Basin economies, usually adversely; 
notably textiles but also color television are adverse examples. To 
the degree that other countries can quickly substitute their production 
and exports for Japanese to the U.S. the effect is beneficial — but 
likely to result in eventual restriction of their exports to the United 
States as well. The central issues for all the Pacific Basin economies 
are global: will the United States through its unilateral policies 
become much more protectionist overall, or by sector, and thereby 
fundamentally reduce the operations of the international trading system 
and dramatically change the rules of the game? Will Japan really become 
a responsible leader in the international trading system by reducing its 
continuing important specific trade barriers? Put more positively, will 
the GATT system persist and be strengthened, and will Japan be fully 
integrated into the world economy? 
II. The Macro Issues: Huge Merchandise Trade and 
Current Account Imbalances 
The burgeoning overall trade imbalances of the United States and 
Japan have come to be the dominant source of friction in the bilateral 
trading relationship. Two of the most important trends in the world 
economy in the five years since 1981 have been the shift in the United 
States from a global balance of payments current account surplus of $6 
billion in 1981 to a deficit of $141 billion (3.8% of GNP) in 1986, and 
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concurrently a sharp increase in Japan's current account surplus from $5 
billion to $87 billion (4.2% of GNP). (See Table 1.) During this period 
the U.S. bilateral current account position with Japan — which has been 
in deficit anyway for structural reasons of Japan's reliance on raw 
materials imports and manufactured goods exports and U.S. openness in 
manufactured imports — increased from a deficit of $14 billion to about 
$55 billion (U.S. data not yet available; 1985 was $45 billion). I use 
the more comprehensive current account measure which combines trade in 
merchandise and trade in services, as well as unilateral transfers (gifts 
and remittances). This is important because in the future the U.S. will 
have to export more goods (or import less) in order to pay the interest 
and dividends (a service item) on its accumulating net foreign debt; 
conversely Japan will export less or import more as it earns interest 
and dividends on its vast foreign assets. 
It is essential to understand that, while these two, mirror-image 
patterns of rising U.S. current account deficit and Japanese surplus are 
related, the basic causes are domestic in each country and are very 
different. Japan's surplus is only in part the cause — or consequence 
more likely — of the U.S. deficit, even though the increase in the 
bilateral deficit is equal to about 28% of the U.S. global deficit 
increase. Nonetheless, by virtue of its size and salience Japan has 
become the symbol to many Americans of the foreign source of U.S. trade 
imbalance problems. 
The intolerably huge rise in the U.S. trade deficit has been one of 
the two most important foreign policy mistakes the United States has made 
in the past quarter-century; the other was Vietnam. Yet it was an 
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unintended by-product of a set of domestic macroeconomic policies in 
1981-83 which, while halting inflation, increasing American military 
strength and reducing personal income tax rates, resulted in an 
increasingly huge Federal budget deficit, internationally high nominal 
and real interest rates, and an overvalued dollar as foreign capital 
was attracted in. Put simply, in 1986 the U.S. spent $141 billion more 
than it produced; it obtained the goods and services needed to fill the 
gap by imports, and paid for them by borrowing from foreigners especially 
Japanese. 
The September 1985 G-5 agreement and the dollar depreciation and 
the yen and European currencies appreciation altered the relative price 
structure between the United States and those countries to make imports 
less attractive and exports more attractive for the U.S.; but until the 
basic spending-production gap (investment-savings gap) is narrowed — 
most readily through reduction in the Federal budget deficit — then the 
U.S. trade and current account deficit problem will not be resolved. It 
is a mistake to think that the cause of the overall deficit is the closed 
market of Japan and other trading partners; their degree of protection 
has decreased in the past five years, not risen. Moreover, while 
reducing those barriers and increasing American export access to those 
markets is highly desirable on its own grounds, it does not constitute 
3 
the major solution. The macroeconomics of global trade imbalances 
should not be confused with the microeconomics of market access. 
The basic cause of Japanfs current account surplus is also 
essentially domestic, though due more to long-run structural factors 
than government macroeconomic policies. Essentially the surplus derives 
8 
from the fact that Japan's private sector saves more than it invests. 
The pattern emerged in the early-mid 1970s, Economic growth rates 
slowed substantially, businessmen considerably invested less (as a share 
of GNP), while private saving decreased much more modestly and slowly. 
This structural pattern was masked by the two oil crises. In the latter 
half of the 1970s, the surplus of private saving over investment was used 
by the government to finance an expansive expenditure program. However, 
from 1981 the government has pursued a contractive expenditure and fiscal 
policy to reduce its budget deficits which were popularly perceived as 
being dangerous in the long-run. This alone would have resulted in a 
balance of payments current account surplus on the order of 1-1.5% of 
GNP, and slower growth. However, at about the same time Japan was 
provided the fortuitous gift of an overvalued dollar which made it easy 
for Japan to go onto an export-oriented growth path until 1986. While 
Japan would have developed a current account surplus, its size would have 
been substantially smaller in the absence of the huge U.S. global trade 
deficit. 
Japan presently faces a domestic macroeconomic policy dilemma; the 
choices are politically not easy. As a consequence of yen appreciation 
— even greater due to the decline in oil prices from late 1985 — 
exports are no longer price competitive and manufactured imports are much 
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more attractive; the economy can no longer rely upon export-led growth. 
Indeed as the current account surplus first levels off and then decreases 
from its present excessive levels (as a share of GNP), trade is having a 
negative effect on growth. What is Japan to do with its surplus savings? 
Tax reform will not have a significant macroeconomic effect on saving 
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behavior in either Japan or the United States. Slowed growth — indeed 
recession as seems quite possible in 1987 — reduces savings but at the 
high cost to Japanese citizens of foregone output, income, and consump-
tion. Monetary policy is less effective in an excess capacity economy. 
Fiscal expansion — increases rather than reductions in government 
deficit financing in the short to medium run — is the solution, but the 
Nakasone government and the Ministry of Finance apparently still remain 
committed to fiscal deficit reduction, not expansion, despite very 
recemt suggestions of an expansive supplementary budget (I think as of 
this writing the 1987 budget has yet to pass). The long-run benefits of 
high Japanese savings rates for Japan and for the world are offset by the 
high short-run costs of slowed growth, structural adjustment problems, 
and continuing trade friction with the U.S. concerning the size of 
Japan's bilateral and global trade surplus. Clearly it is in Japan's 
domestic interests to have good, stable, domestic demand-based growth; it 
is also important for the world economy. The direct impact on the U.S. 
trade deficit is in fact small, but the indirect effects via the multi-
lateral trading system are considerably more substantial. 
The key bilateral macroeconomic trade issues are: will the U.S. 
reduce its global trade deficit and if so, by what process? Will Japan 
achieve a good GNP growth rate — say 3.5 to 4.5% — even as its current 
account surplus decreases? Will the extreme change in the dollar-yen 
exchange rate relative to the globally traded weighted exchange rate 
of each currency succeed in reducing the bilateral deficit more than 
proportionately? Each country must pursue domestic fiscal policies to 
achieve the objectives of contraction in the U.S. and expansion in Japan. 
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Nonetheless, given their interdependence and global importance of these 
two economies, each has a stake in how the other resolves its policy 
problem, and each will benefit from cooperative solutions. Substantial 
further yen appreciation and dollar depreciation (vis a vis the yen, 
though not other currencies whose countries have current account 
surpluses and which have not appreciated much) is not the optimal ad-
justment mechanism and probably note even desirable; it would generate 
recession in Japan and inflation in the United States. Moreover, there 
are real dangers of the dollar's free fall and hard landing with dire 
consequences for all. 
The optimal timing and pattern of trade imbalance reductions is not 
clear, nor are equilibrium (or policy target) levels. An American 
reduction in its global trade deficit on the order of $25-$30 billion 
annually for the next five years appears attractive; a faster rate may be 
domestically difficult to achieve (and probably undesirable) and would 
reduce world trade demand excessively, to the detriment not only of 
Pacific Basin but all economies. A more modest Japanese reduction of its 
global trade surplus, say by $10 billion a year might be reasonable, 
particularly if Japan provides capital to developing countries to 
maintain existing net trade positions as U.S. demand for their goods 
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decreases. 
A danger is that both countries may mistakenly attempt to resolve 
their global trade imbalances by direct actions aimed only at each other. 
It has been suggested that the United States impose a large surcharge on 
imports from Japan (and a few other countries). That would reduce the 
U.S. bilateral deficit with Japan, but to a large extent would mean that 
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imports would simply shift to other countries in the Pacific Basin and 
elsewhere without reducing the U.S. global trade deficit (as in consumer 
electronics, for example). Some Japanese leaders have suggested that the 
only way to deal in the present, ongoing crisis with the United States is 
to reduce Japanese exports to the United States by direct action — an 
export surcharge or export quotas. That too, given Japan's large 
savings surplus, would mean that Japanese exports would increase in 
third markets, to some considerable degree at direct expense of 
competing U.S. exports to those markets. Such bilateral "solutions" are 
no solution at all: they do not much affect the respective global trade 
imbalances, they generate inefficiencies in resource allocation, and 
then undermine the multilateral system of trade adjustment. 
III. The Micro Issues: Market Access, Structural Adjustment, 
and Protectionism 
The most important and enduring trade issue in the U.S.-Japan 
economic relationship has been and will continue to be American business 
access to the Japanese domestic market, mainly in terms of exports though 
at times American direct investment or business entry into Japan is of 
concern. The American government negotiating effort has been two-fold: 
to seek general reductions in tariffs, quotas, and other official non-
tariff barriers through GATT rounds of negotiations or "unilateral11 
actions by Japan (the series of market-opening packages); and to press 
for reductions in specific sectors or on specific products (oranges, 
beef, aluminum bats, cigarettes, the MOSS negotiations; see Table 2 for 
recent issues). The product-by-product approach has taken the most time; 
is also used to raise generic issues (government procurement, standards, 
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private barriers); and has received the most publicity and hence is a 
major source of ongoing friction. Japan's market opening measures are 
multilateral and most-favored-nation in principle, though not 
surprisingly the items are usually of particular interest to American 
producers. 
A secondary bilateral issue (in American perspective at least of 
the sources of friction) has been to place restrictions, formal or 
informal, on Japanese access to the very open U.S. market — mainly in 
politically powerful industries (textiles, steel, automobiles, 
semiconductors) but at times to help a specific interest while "sending a 
general signal" and defusing anti-Japanese pressure in Congress (the OMA 
in color television, the tariff on motorcycles, the April 17, 1987 
announcement of prohibitive tariffs on $300 million of Japanese port-
able and desk-top computers, color television sets, and power hand tools 
in retaliation for alleged non-performance of the Semiconductor 
Agreement.) Japan has pragmatically pioneered in the development of a 
new trade-restrictive instrument, the voluntary export restraint (VER), 
which the United States has eagerly endorsed. The general American 
restrictions represent special bilateral deals, outside and contrary to 
GATT rules; they solve immediate problems but undermine the stated norms 
and rules of the international trading system. Such arrangements are the 
only significant way in which the United States Government attempts to 
deal with the very real and serious problems of structural adjustment of 
major industries in trouble. 
The key issues are: to what degree and how quickly will Japan 
remove its remaining trade barriers? Will the United States halt its 
procession of protectionist steps (stand still), and indeed remove 
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recently imposed barriers (roll-back)? Can the U.S. devise effective, 
positive mechanisms for solving major industry structural adjustment 
problems which are not import restrictive? 
In both nations these are politically difficult goals, yet essential 
if the open multilateral trading system is to prevail. Both countries 
face real problems of structural adjustment in major sectors of large 
employment (agriculture in Japan, steel in both nations, for example). 
In certain industries, mainly high tech, issues of competitiveness are 
complicated by national security concerns and objectives. These are 
explicit in the U.S.; and quite often American firms use the national 
security argument for protection without strong or clear justification. 
The articulation of Japan's national security interests is deliberately 
opaque and vague, and certainly not strongly stated; recent and pro-
spective actions indicate they are nonetheless real, primarily in terms 
of maintaining and developing options in high technology sectors with 
significant potential military application (satellites, supercomputers, 
telecommunications, the new fighter plane). 
A great deal of nonsense has been said in the current debate on 
the competitiveness (or lack thereof) of American industries. At the 
macro level the key factors are the exchange rate for price competi-
tiveness, basic and applied R&D, the performance of the education system, 
and systemic changes in the managerial system and in the system of 
industrial relations. The exchange rate is especially important in the 
short-run (and longer if misalignment persists) because it determines 
where in the competitive ranking of industries the cut-off will be 
between industries able to compete in export markets and those facing 
import competition. The 53-88% (trade weighted) dollar overvaluation 
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made a whole class of normally competitive industries uncompetitive in 
price terms; dollar devaluation has reversed that course, though probably 
not yet to the 1980 cut-off point. 
However, competitiveness is also quintessentially a micro phenomenon: 
how well do individual firms compete in costs, quality, prices, and 
innovation with their competitors, at home and abroad? The fundamental 
causes of changes in the competitiveness of specific industries lie in 
the process of growth -- the relative acquisition of human skills, new 
technologies, capital formation, management techniques — not just in the 
U.S. and Japan but throughout the world. To this theory of comparative 
advantage one must add the specific features of industrial structure, 
technological change, development of specific products, and the like 
which drive trade between countries within the same industry category 
(intra-industry trade). The global spread of the industrial revolution 
not only to Japan but now to the NICs is inexorable and inevitable, a 
reality which American companies must deal with. Japanese and NIC 
competitiveness is not going to disappear; it will simply move from one 
sector to another as countries climb the technology-skilled labor-capital 
formation ladder. 
In the case of Japan, over the past fifteen years, its economy and 
trade policy have moved from highly protected and protectionist to one in 
which in general official import barriers — tariffs, quotas, and other 
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non-tariff barriers — are among the lowest of the industrial nations. 
Nonetheless, foreign frustrations — certainly American, but those of 
other Pacific Basin economies and the European Community as well — 
concerning lack of real access to Japanese markets remain high. There 
are two major substantive reasons. 
15 
First, official barriers remain high in a large number of specific 
products in which American, or other foreign producers, are very 
competitive. These include agricultural and other land-based commodities 
in both raw and processed form (from foodstuffs to timber to cigarettes 
to chocolate candy); energy-intensive products, such as petrochemicals 
and refined petroleum products (gasoline); other industrial products 
(from caustic soda to pharmaceuticals to medical equipment); certain high 
technology goods (military equipment, satellites, telecommunications 
equipment); and especially for its Pacific Basin neighbors, labor-
intensive manufactures (textiles, footwear). These issues have been 
handled by U«S. and Japanese negotiators mainly on a product-by-product 
basis. The products change,, but the issues remain. It involves 
real slogging through the trenches of commercial policy at the micro 
level. In the past the American agenda of priority items has often been 
determined by domestic political or bureaucratic considerations rather 
than size of potential trade benefit (for example oranges, Kansai airport 
construction) for the United States. 
The second source of frustration is more intractable; it lies in the 
private, non-governmental obstacles to imports. Basically the Japanese 
society and economy is not outsider-friendly. "Culture" is too readily 
offered as an explanation without specifying what is meant. Obviously 
the Japanese language is a real obstacle to some business in Japan. 
(English is less of a barrier in that it is now the international 
language of commerce and diplomacy, so that the benefits of learning 
English are far greater.) But a number of institutional arrangements and 
behavioral patterns also make it more difficult to penetrate Japanese 
than most markets, including the distribution network; long-term 
16 
relationships between groups of suppliers and buyers; weaker anti-trust 
laws and implementation than in the U.S. which allow far greater 
exercise of market power; and a system of conflict resolution that relies 
upon private negotiation, mediationt and compromise rather than the legal 
system and courts. Market entry costs are high — a quality product, 
high service, substantial investment, and a long-term strategy and 
commitment are requisite. The pay-off can be very profitable, as a 
number of American firms exporting to and producing in the Japanese 
market quietly attest. 
It is not that Japanese consumers are xenophobic; they prefer high 
quality, low priced goods regardless of source. Japanese companies, 
however, do have a preference to obtain intermediate inputs from Japanese 
sources — as much for reasons of convenience, assurance of stable supply 
and quality, and long-term implicit contractual relationships as for any 
explicit anti-foreign attitudes per se, I surmise. Preferred reliance on 
domestic suppliers is characteristic of all economies, but is probably 
carried further in Japan than elsewhere. 
The relatively small size of Japan*s imports compared to GNP, and 
of manufactured imports as a share of total imports and, more relevantly as 
a share of GNP or total apparent consumption of manufactures, have been 
argued to imply pervasive Japanese protectionism. A series of studies 
refutes this argument; they show that both the share and pattern are 
normal, reflecting Japan's paucity of natural resources and its distance 
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from major markets. Macroeconomists argue that, given Japan's 
surplus of savings over investment, it inevitably will have a surplus of 
exports over imports. The implication is that if Japan is to import a 
higher percentage of manufactured goods (as it will) then exports will 
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also have to rise, though not as much since the size of the current 
account surplus relative to GNP will decrease, and will involve less 
merchandise exports as interest and profit income rises. 
Trade issues in high technology industries are particularly 
difficult to deal with, as the 1986 Summer U.S.-Japan semiconductor 
trade agreement epitomizes. R&D is very important, technology changes 
rapidly, and the process of learning-by-doing, learning-from-others, 
diffusion of tech-nology, and leapfrogging is complicated, poorly 
understood, and hence difficult to evaluate. In semiconductors and 
microelectronics more broadly there are direct military/national security 
implications — in telecommunications, data processing, military hard-
ware, for example. Should the U.S. maintain a full-blown semiconductor 
industry including substantial capacity in commodity chips for defense 
reasons? If so, are the semiconductor capacities of IBM and AT&T 
sufficient for emergency defense needs, or are a number of merchant 
vendors of commodity chips required in addition? If so, how should the 
costs be borne and how can the incentives best be provided for efficient 
production and aggregate rates and kinds of R&D? Based on industrial 
experience to date, import restriction is an inefficient mechanism to 
implement the type of industry-specific policy some argue is needed to 
maintain adequate levels and types of civilian goods production and 
innovation to meet military needs. 
The 1986 U.S.-Japan semiconductor agreement is seriously flawed: 
it does not solve the problems of American semiconductor producer 
productivity and competitiveness; it embodies bad economics, and it is 
virtually impossible to administer (monitor and implement) effectively. 
Perhaps we should not be surprised that it became bad politics as well. 
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The economics are bad because it sets a floor price on commodity 
semiconductors applicable not just in the U.S. but the world, with the 
price based on Japanese average rather than marginal cost of production 
plus a high profit rate (8% of sales); and it requires Japan somehow to 
increase substantially its imports of commodity chips from American 
producers in the United States, with target market shares strongly 
implied. The floor price system is a U.S.-Japan producer de_ facto 
worldwide price cartel arrangements harmful in itself and impossible 
to maintain. Korean producers are lower cost and production is shifted 
to them; semiconductor users are hurt in the United States and helped in 
Japan; leakages via third countries and in other ways in essentially 
an unregulated, relatively unconcentrated, market-driven commodity chip 
market are inevitably large and very difficult to prevent. The U.S. 
insistence on a substantially increased market share in Japan, somehow 
guaranteed by the Japanese government, is difficult to implement since 
semiconductor users in Japan as in the United States are highly 
ompetitive firms operating in private markets. MITI does not have such 
enforcement power to re-quire purchases, and consonant with objectives of 
moving to increasingly competitive, open, market-oriented system in 
Japan, should not have such powers. 
The actions of President Reagan on March 27, 1987 announcing 
imposition of prohibitive tariffs on $300 million worth of selected 
Japanese electronic and industrial goods in retaliation for Japanfs 
non-enforcement of the Semiconductor Agreement — both pricing in third 
markets and access to the Japanese market — is not only symbolic of 
both the difficulties of dealing with high tech trade issues and the 
bilateral mismanagement of these issues, but has substantive meaning as 
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well. It became a lightning rod, one of several, for Japanese articulation 
of feelings of frustration and anger at the United States for "Jap-bashing" 
and scapegoating; in Japanese perspective the real U.S. economic problems 
lie at home (inability to control the budget deficit, lack of industrial 
competitiveness and productivity growth, poor quality control, and lack 
of effective export efforts). 
The dilemma is that the trade negotiations in both countries have 
fallen into a negotiating approach and style which may (appear to) 
resolve specific issues satisfactorily but has the cumulative effect of 
substantially increasing the American perceptions of Japanese in-
transigence and unfairness, and Japanese perceptions of American 
"Jap-bashing" in which scapegoating of Japan is substituted for American 
efforts to solve their own problems* The gap between American and 
Japanese on perceptions of each other has never been so wide. 
The pattern is as follows. Japan never initiates any market opening 
actions; it does so only in response to U.S. pressure. Moreover, 
Japanese officials initially resist American requests through delaying 
tactics and inaction; American negotiators press harder and harder, 
typically with an increasing sense of frustration and irritation. Only 
when American pressure becomes very intense, often quite politicized, do 
Japanese negotiators make concessions. The lesson: Japan will respond 
only when it is hit hard. 
There are complications on each side. Japanese bureaucrats 
frequently seek U.S. pressure in order to resolve a difficult domestic 
political impasse which prevents a decision, enabling them to blame the 
resolution on U.S. pressure (e.g., scapegoating the U.S.). The U.S. 
Administration negotiators and members of Congress on occasion engage 
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in a "good guy-bad guy" routine to exert greater pressure on Japan. 
Moreover, it may well be that economically relatively modest items are 
deliberately placed on the agenda. A choreography proceeds in which 
Japanese negotiators resist, American negotiators press. Eventually 
Japan makes a concession, and the American negotiators can plausibly 
claim a symbolic victory which indicates that Japan is really changing 
its ways, that the Administration has the Japan relationship fully under 
control, and Congress need not undertake any trade restrictive or 
retaliatory legislation. 
This negotiating procedure is a fundamentally flawed approach 
to management of such an important, mutually beneficial alliance rela-
tionship. While the negotiators may understand the game and its rules 
well (perhaps a charitable interpretation), it is not at all clear that 
members of Congress and the Diet do, that the media do, or that the 
general public does. Yet the inevitable entrance of these issues into 
the public domain, because of the way in which the press-resist process 
is played out, mean that Americans in general develop an ever-growing 
sense of frustration and anger over Japanese "unfairness" which is loudly 
articulated; and that Japanese develop an ever-growing sense of 
frustration and anger over American "unreasonableness" and arrogance 
which up to now has been voiced only in a quite muted manner, but is 
likely to become increasingly vociferous. 
The concern of all — Americans, Japanese, those in the Pacific Basin 
and elsewhere — is that the frustration, anger, and resentment engendered 
by the style of negotiations will negatively affect substantive outcomes. 
Anger often leads to emotional appeals for retaliation. Retaliation 
itself is always market-restricting, though American threats of 
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restrictive retribution are part of the choreography in pressing Japan to 
open markets. The danger of decisions based on emotions and sentiment is 
that they typically diverge from optimal policies based on a careful 
rational assessment of one's own national interest. 
The recent rhetoric in the United States and Japan, enflamed by the 
media in both countries, that we are entering a "trade war" is the wrong 
metaphor and a serious mistake. A trade war means sharp diminution, 
indeed virtual cessation, of trade and other economic relations: 
application of major sanctions embargoing exports and imports of goods 
and capital (who trades with the enemy, after all). That would strike 
at the core of all dimensions of the U.S.-Japan relationship, since at 
that level all are linked. No responsible policymaker or thoughtful 
citizen would seriously espouse a trade war; the harm to one's own 
country, much less the other and indeed the world system would be too 
great. 
A more appropriate analogy is between two long-term business 
partners and close friends, each with his/her own self-interests but 
very strong mutually beneficial interests as well from the relation-
ship. Over time their relationship has grown; and the junior partner has 
been more dynamic, taking a greater share of the ever-increasing action. 
As in any close relationship specific disagreements and problems emerge 
from time to time, important in themselves and reflective of the evolving 
power relationship between the two. The senior partner frets that the 
junior partner is too pert, aggressive and selfish, does not take greater 
responsibility for the relationship; the junior partner worries that the 
senior partner is getting soft, and somehow is unable to manage himself 
and the partnership as well as he did in the past. The senior partner 
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becomes increasingly resentful that while he shares his business with 
the junior partner, the junior partner shows little willingness in turn 
to share his own, now very large business, and only grudgingly gives in 
to increasingly sharp protests from the senior partner as the commercial 
imbalance between the two grows and grows. Yet things are basically 
going so well and both are benefitting so much that neither seriously 
contemplates ending the partnership; too much would be lost. 
Then for domestic reasons the senior partner suddenly decides he 
must spend a great deal more than his income, has to get real resources 
not all from his junior partner but from all others with whom he does 
business, and has to borrow to finance these resource inflows from his 
partner, as well as others — in growing amounts for five years and then 
in declining amounts (hopefully) for another five years or so. The now 
strong junior partner is generating large cash flow and does not know how 
to invest it at home, and is glad to lend it at good interest rates to 
such a good market risk as well as good friend. After all they are 
partners. They have now become huge partners with huge benefits, but the 
commercial imbalance has become intolerable for the senior partner, 
serious strains are apparent on both sides, the senior partner is piling 
up more and more debts, while struggling to get his house in order. 
While he recognizes that many of his problems are his own creation, he 
also knows that his partner's vigorous expansion and direct competitive-
ness are an important source of his difficulties as well. The partners 
are at an impasse: it would be crazy to end the partnership since the 
costs would be too great; but over the years they have developed a 
mind-set and mechanisms for handling their problems that no longer work. 
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Each is unhappy; each blames the other; and each has to get his own 
house in order to make the partnership more manageable and beneficial, 
IV. Systemic Issues: Bilateral Undermining of 
the Multilateral Trading System 
The United States and Japan are each such large members of the 
international economy that the ways in which each resolves its own or 
bilateral issues have an impact not just on the other Pacific Basin and 
other economies but on the nature and rules of the international trading 
system itself. Thus, while systemic issues are inherently global, the 
United States and Japan individually, and even more so in joint 
bilateral actions, play a dominant leadership role, for better or 
worse. The effects are at both the macro and micro, or sectoral, levels. 
The keystone of American foreign economic policy over the past 40 
years has been the development, maintenance, and strengthening of an 
open, multilateral trading system under GATT based on fundamental 
principles of non-discrimination (most-favored-nation treatment), 
prohibition in principle of quantitative restrictions (quotas), 
elimination of tariffs, and equal national treatment of domestic and 
foreign-owned firms. The very success of earlier rounds of negotiations 
to reduce tariffs on manufactured goods, culminating in the Tokyo Round 
in 1977, has brought to the fore a whole host of new issues: quotas, 
standards, trade barriers in agriculture and services, intellectual 
property rights, structural adjustment and safeguards, et cetera. While 
GATT has many problems, it nonetheless continues to play a major institu-
tional role in inhibiting major countries from going protectionist and 
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hence in maintaining the existing system; in serving as the ongoing 
focus to negotiate further reductions in remaining tariffs and non-
tariff barriers; and in providing some mechanism, though flawed, for new 
negotiations on even more difficult agenda items. 
Vis a vis Japan, the U.S. multilateral policy thrust has been 
largely successful: to have Japan become a full-fledged member of GATT, 
to commit itself in principle to a policy of free trade and open access 
to its markets, and to take an increasing leadership role in GATT, 
particularly in the negotiations to initiate the new Uruguay Round of 
GATT negotiations. Japan of course adopted those policies to achieve 
its own goals since it is one of the major beneficiaries of the 
international trading system. In practice, however, there have been 
three major problems: Japan's slowness to open remaining important 
specific markets (discussed in the previous section); Japan's 
initiative, at least certainly its willingness, to strike bilateral 
deals with the United States and the European Community which are outside 
of, contravene, and hence undermine, the GATT system; and Japan's 
reluctance to take on a leadership role in the maintenance and management 
of the international trading system. 
The key systemic macro issue: can the international economic system 
simultaneously maintain both free trade and free financial and capital 
flows when major countries pursue divergent macroeconomic policies, made 
possible by a flexible exchange rate system, which result in huge national 
trade imbalances for a sustained period of time? This is being tested in 
the United States now; it may well be that when trade deficits become as 
large as they have, the U.S. is no longer willing to maintain an un-
fettered free and open trading system. But Japan constitutes another 
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test. Japan's huge trade surplus may be fine from a purely Japanese 
perspective, but its excessive size is unacceptable to the U.S. and other 
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major leaders of the trading system. Hence the strong desire in 
current G-7 policy discussions to achieve a reasonable and stable target 
zone of exchange rates now that the extreme misalignment of dollar 
overvaluation and yen undervaluation have been corrected. Essentially 
that discussion rests on arguments for coordination of macroeconomic 
policies among the major players, notably the United States, Japan, and 
West Germany since exchange rates are the symptomatic consequence of the 
interplay of domestic macro policies and behavior, and especially 
expectations of market participants regarding changes in these variables, 
rather than being a major independent policy variable. 
To summarize, if both the United States and Japan cannot reduce 
their trade imbalances through macro measures, and if they cannot pursue 
macroeconomic policies along parallel (if not formally coordinated) 
rather than divergent paths, than there is increasing likelihood the 
United States will abandon its free trade policy for one of some 
form of protectionism (probably managed trade of major manufacturing 
sectors, as is discussed below). That would substantially alter the 
international trading system as we know it — to the disadvantage of the 
United States, Japan, and the whole world, since the benefits to specific 
anti-trade interest groups would nowhere meet the costs borne by the 
general public. 
At the same time, the micro foundations of the international trading 
system have been under increasing threat as an unintended consequence of 
the ways in which the United States and Japan handle their specific 
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sectoral and product frictions with each other. There have been two 
countervailing forces. 
On the one hand, in support of the system Japan has substantially 
reduced its trade barriers, particularly in manufactured goods (its 
source of competitive advantage). Much of this has been due in. 
significant part to ongoing American pressure on Japan to open its 
markets. Much also simply reflects changes in Japan's economic power and 
competitiveness; not only was it viewed as "inevitable" that Japan reduce 
its import barriers, it became increasingly evident it was in its own 
narrow interest to do so, as well as in its interest in supporting the 
international system. After all, that is what countries are supposed to 
do under the implicit dynamic rules of the GATT game. ("Graduation" 
which Japan achieved in 1964, is one step in what should be perceived as 
an ongoing process.) Indeed the foreign complaint is that Japan has 
moved much too slowly, and has required far too much foreign pressure, in 
the pace and kind of liberalization it should undertake as a GATT member 
and world leader. In this perspective comparison of the degree of 
Japan's protection vis a vis the United States or the European Community 
is irrelevant. Leadership requires that countries, particularly Japan, 
in a good economic position — steady growth, low inflation, low 
unemploy ment rates, current account surpluses — should continuously 
reduce remaining trade barriers in order to maintain and strengthen the 
GATT system. Japan lost a great opportunity to open its markets greatly 
between 1982-1985 when its exports were greowing rapidly and adjustment 
would have been less difficult; now it faces liberalization in an adverse 
domestic and external environment. The major systemic problem comes from 
the way in which Japan and the United States have resolved trade problems 
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affecting specific American industries where import penetration by 
Japanese firms have hurt American producers. The United States has 
sought to solve difficulties of domestic structural adjustment by taking 
some form of ad^ hoc specific import-restrictive measures as exceptions to 
the general rule of open, competitive markets. Typically, these measures 
have been initially negotiated with Japan in a series of bilateral deals, 
entirely outside the GATT system* In the process new policy instruments 
have been developed and applied to an ever-increasing range of products; 
and the U.S. import restrictions have been applied to an ever-increasing 
number of countries from which the United States imports. 
The cumulative effects of these specific deals is huge. Some 43% 
of U.S. imports are now covered by special non-tarrif barriers, most of 
them imposed in the past decade and most as a direct consequence of 
13 bilateral arrangements with Japan. The size of such bilateral deals 
means they no longer can be considered a minor exception; they 
constitute a major challenge to the GATT multilateral system in its very 
area of strength, namely manufactures. Indeed, it appears the United 
States, Japan, and the world are well on the way to a system of managed 
(some would say centralized) trade rather than free trade in major 
sectors. 
The most fully developed manifestation of this pattern is the 
Multi-Fiber Agreement (MFA) for textiles, under which developed 
countries impose commodity and counter specific quotas on the full range 
of natural and synthetic yarns, cloth, and garments from developing 
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countries. This multi-country multi-product monstrosity evolved in a 
series of broadening actions out of a simple U.S.-Japan bilateral 
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voluntary export restraint agreement in 1957 to limit U.S. imports of 
Japanese "dollar blouses" and imprinted cotton cloth. Steel, automobiles, 
and (temporarily at least) semiconductors are now well along the path to 
managed trade. 
A number of new import-restrictive policy instruments have been 
devised, or old ones resurrected, by the United States and Japan working 
together to solve specific sector problems. Color television imports 
from Japan came under an orderly marketing agreement (OMA) in the late 
1970s. The trigger price mechanism (TPM) set a floor price on steel 
imports from all countries between 1977-1981; that mechanism acknowledged 
Japanese steel companies were on average, the world's lowest-cost pro-
ducers, and used their constructed average (rather than marginal) costs 
of production to set the floor price. MIT1 and the Japanese steel 
industry cooperated with the Department of Commerce to obtain industry-
wide average cost estimates. When the dollar exchange rate rose from 
1981 so that steel import floor prices dropped, the U.S. industry forced 
the termination of the TPM and were successful in having the U.S. 
-Government impose import quotas (negotiated bilateral voluntary export 
restraints) in their place. The constructed average cost procedure (with 
a high profit margin) to set floor prices, based on the anti-dumping 
provisions of the 1974 Trade Act, is generally regarded as a violation of 
GATT rules; most U.S. exports would not meet the import pricing test. 
Nonetheless, it has been applied in the 1986 U.S.-Japan semiconductor 
agreement to Japanese exports of semiconductors not just to the United 
States but to the entire world. This agreement has aspects of an 
implicit cartel, seemingly presuming that American producers will have 
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relatively preferential position in the U.S. market, Japanese producers 
in the Japanese market (though the U.S. market access provision runs 
counter), and European producers in the European market. 
Perhaps the most important new trade-restrictive instrument to 
develop out of U.S.-Japan bilateral negotiations is the voluntary export 
restraint (VER). Rather than the U.S. imposing import restrictions, 
it prevails upon Japan "voluntarily" to restrict exports of particular 
products to the U.S., typically by having MITI allocate quotas to 
Japanese producers. I suspect this instrument was invented by Japanese 
officials. It certainly appeals to their preference for ad_ hoc case-by-
case, pragmatic compromises rather than application of universal systemic 
principles; moreover, it enhances the now-waning powers of MITI bureau-
crats. A VER has the advantage of fairly frequent (annual) review; it is 
flexible; and it can be readily removed when conditions no longer warrant 
its continuation. The VER system is likely to be most effective in 
concentrated industries of relatively few producers, both for quota 
allocations and to monitor and prevent possible cheating. Like other 
quota systems, the VER is less efficient in resource allocation and 
degree of welfare loss than tariffs or subsidies — but it has its 
presumed real-world political-administrative advantages of feasibility. 
Moreover, it (like other quota systems) means that the extraordinary 
profits (rents in economic terminology) on imports resulting from higher 
prices consumers pay may well be captured by the export producer rather 
than by the importing country, in contrast to a tariff. This makes the 
VER economically and politically attractive to the exporting country. 
Its alleged voluntary feature makes it attractive to the importing 
country with systemic responsibilities. 
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The first VER in postwar U.S.-Japan trade was on a few cotton 
textile items from 1957, as already noted. The major VER in U.S.-Japan 
trade has been on U.S. automobile imports from Japan since 1981. 
American consumers in effect did much to keep a number of possibly 
marginal Japanese automobile producers in business; their high profits in 
the U.S. market offset losses in Japan since 1984, perhaps earlier, only 
one Japanese producer has apparently made money in the Japanese market). 
Yen appreciation has eliminated these extraordinary profits in the U.S. 
market for Japanese car producers, and they have had to raise prices 
somewhat to prevent losses. The VER is more than a modest exception to 
free trade; in 1986 U.S. imports of automobiles, trucks, and automotive 
parts from Japan amounted to $32.8 billion (c.i.f.), 40.1% of U.S. total 
imports from Japan (cars alone were $21.1 billion). 
Bilateral trade restrictive deals with Japan or other major 
partners almost always reflect an American attempt to help certain 
politically-powerful industries facing severe import competition while 
not abandoning the rhetoric of free trade principles. However, import 
restriction is probably a less efficient mechanism for domestic 
structural adjustment than a package of other policies (labor retraining, 
subsidies, low interest rate loans, performance criteria, etc.), 
assuming the government must do something. One problem with bilateral 
deals is that they encourage shifting of production to other countries, 
which then replace Japan's exports in the U.S. market. To be effective, 
the bilateral arrangement over time has to be extended to other major 
countries producing the particular product, and to its close substitutes. 
This is the road to product-specific managed trade — with the definition 
of the product ever widening. 
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Ultimately the success of the international economic system 
depends on its ability to integrate Japan into the system as a major 
player and fully established member. This will require changes in 
behavior and perceptions in the United States and Japan, and Western 
Europe as well. Japan is reluctant to assume a role of economic 
leadership but that will be increasingly forced upon Japan if it does 
not want the trading system to fall apart and its economic relations 
with the U.S. to deteriorate further. 
What are the systemic responsibilities of economic leadership? 
First and foremost is to open one's domestic markets to inflows of goods, 
services, and capital: to remove remaining barriers, and to eschew the 
new imposition of import restrictions to solve structural adjustment 
problems as they inevitably arise in specific products and sectors. The 
reality, and especially the foreign perception, must become that Japan is 
truly an open economy. Second, an economic leader must support very 
substantially the economic development process of the Third World — by 
importing, by providing foreign aid, by technology transfer, by capital 
flows. Third, an economic leader must contribute to the world pool of 
basic scientific and technological knowledge through its own basic R&D 
efforts. Fourth, an economic leader must make it possible, and indeed 
attractive, for its currency to be used for international trade trans-
actions, to denominate capital flows, and as a central bank reserve 
currency. By all these criteria Japan has made substantial progress over 
the past decade — and still has a long way to go. 
The United States and Japan together pursue contradictory 
policies. They endorse and support GATT; and they systematically and 
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increasingly strike specific-sector deals on access to the U.S. market. 
The present GATT round provides an opportunity to place greater emphasis 
on the multilateral approach for resolution of such problems. Nonetheless 
there is the real danger that bilateral deals will continue to be the 
approach used in the future to solve particular problems in manufactured 
goods trade, that the arrangements will be generalized, and that a 
greater proportion of trade in manufactures will come under MFA-like 
arrangements. If so, much of that process will continue to emerge from 
the way in which the U.S. and Japan deal with each other. If this 
occurs, the international trading system will evolve into something quite 
different, and more restrictive, than the vision of the founders of the 
postwar international trading system. The great systemic challenge for 
U.S. and Japanese trade policy alike over the next 5-10 years of Uruguay 
Round negotiations is to strengthen and expand the multilateral system of 
open, non-discriminatory trade while dealing positively with the very 
real problems of structural adjustment that are an inevitable element in 
the process of economic growth, technological change, and expansion of 
trade. 
V. Implications for the Pacific Basin Economies 
The implications for the other Pacific Basin economies as to how 
the United States and Japan manage their bilateral trade relationship 
are profound and obvious. The United States and Japan are by far the 
world's as well as the region's largest economies, the major trading 
partners for the other Pacific Basin economies, and both the maintainers 
and underminers of the GATT-based international trading system. 
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Moreover, virtually all the Pacific Basin economies are pursuing an 
export-oriented development strategy — the NICs and Malaysia to a great 
degree, the others, even China and perhaps Australia, more modestly but 
nonetheless significantly. For better or worse — and there is much of 
both — the trading practices and policies of the United States and 
Japan, indi-vidually and jointly, have major impacts on Pacific Basin 
economic growth, trade policies, and development strategies. 
As the success of the Asian NICs well demonstrates, the Pacific 
Basin economies benefit immensely from participation in the still quite 
open multilateral trading system in manufactures. These benefits are 
linked directly to good, sustained economic growth by the United States 
and Japan, to the maintenance (in the U.S.) and expansion (in Japan) of 
open markets, and to further liberalization and strengthening of the 
GATT-based multilateral trading system and its rules. 
Analytically, the positive and negative spill-over effects of the 
U.S.-Japan trading relationship can be placed in the macro, micro, and 
systemic perspectives provided above, even though in practice these 
issues are closely intertwined. The key issues for the Pacific Basin 
economies are how the U.S. and Japan will reduce their respective global 
trade imbalances; what the yen-dollar exchange rate will be; whether the 
U.S. will take protectionist measures which seriously restrict access to 
all or important segments of the American market; whether Japan will 
continue its market opening process, particularly in land-based and labor 
intensive sectors, without retreating from existing levels of openness; 
the effect of U.S.-Japan specific product bilateral deals in the short-
run and the longer run; whether the U.S. and Japanese bilateral preoccu-
pation on each other means each is less responsive to the broader 
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interests and concerns of the Pacific Basin region to their detriment, or 
on net balance has positive spill-over effects; and whether the U.S. and 
Japan will succeed in strengthening the GATT multilateral system, or 
continue the process toward managed trade in major sectors. 
The greatest long-run benefit of the U.S.-Japan trade relationship 
to the Pacific Basin economies, still yet to be fully realized, has been 
its contribution to the gradual but steady and now quite substantial 
opening of the Japanese market, due in considerable part to U.S. 
pressure. Less noticed, but politically of equal importance, is that 
U.S. pressure has created a policy environment which for more than a 
decade now precludes Japan from exercising the policy option of raising 
now-lowered import barriers in industries facing temporary difficulty or 
structural adjustment. Japan can no longer utilize the anti-recession 
cartels of the 1950s and 1960s, which operated behind existing high 
import barriers, to cope with sectoral problems. The very rapid decline 
in less than ten years in Japanese aluminum smelting capacity — by 90%, 
from 20% to less than 2% of world capacity, from 16 smelters to one 
(owned by Alcan and based on captive cheap hydroelectric power) — is the 
most extreme illustration. 
There are, however, two problems. First, as already stressed, Japan 
has significant specific import barriers remaining. Many are of 
particular interest to Pacific Basin economies but not the U.S. so they 
have not been on the bilateral agenda until recently, when the U.S. 
became concerned about the disparity between high American and low 
Japanese absorption of Pacific Basin labor-intensive manufactures. On 
occasion, the U.S. has negotiated specific market liberalizations which 
benefit American producers to the detriment of other Pacific Basin 
economies; American negotiator success in expanding Japan's import quota 
solely of high quality beef, rather than all beef as a broad product 
category, has not been beneficial to Australian beef producers, for 
instance. 
Second, now that the Japanese economy is entering its own painful 
phase of structural adjustment and slowed growth in the near term as a 
consequence of yen appreciation and domestic policies, will it deviate 
from its general policy of not imposing new import restrictions in 
particularly troubled sectors? Following the sharp rise in imports of 
textiles in 1986, it appears that Japan is currently negotiating VERs 
with South Korea and Taiwan. This will be a dangerous step backwards, 
in itself and as a possible precedent for future Japanese actions. 
This is not an area in which Japan "should learn from the West" except 
that negative lesson that this is not the appropriate trade policy path. 
Future Japanese future import policies in textiles, steel, and even 
automobiles will no doubt be monitored carefully. With the large yen 
appreciation vis a vis the dollar, many segments of Japan's manufactures 
sector are no longer price-competitive with imports. In the absence of 
new restrictions, Japan's imports of manufacture can be expected to 
continue to rise substantially, in absolute amounts and as a share of 
GNP and domestic consumption of manufactures. 
The Pacific Basin economies have greatly and particularly benefitte 
from the remarkable growth in U.S. imports in the 1980s. U.S. import 
demand has been the main locomotive pulling these export-oriented 
economies forward. Inevitably they will lose this important external 
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stimulus to a significant extent as the U.S. over time reduces its global 
trade deficit. How much depends on three factors: the degree to which 
the U.S. substitutes Pacific Basin imports for those from Japan or other 
parts of the world; the degree to which increases in Japanese imports 
from the Pacific Basin economies offset their reduction in exports to the 
U.S.; and the degree to which increases in U.S. manufacturing production 
is for import-substitution rather than exports. 
The process by which the United States attempts to reduce its 
global trade deficit will be significant. What some members of Congress 
may see as a range of policy options are in macro terms spurious: major 
import restrictions (protectionism); substantially increased access to 
foreign markets (retaliation threats); increasing U.S. competitiveness; 
or further dollar devaluation. At best they contribute by making 
import-substituting or export production more attractive. Fundamentally 
the U.S. has to reduce domestic demand while increasing domestic pro-
duction, through a combination of reduction in the Federal budget deficit 
and a substitution of U.S. for foreign manufactures at home and abroad. 
The various combinations of policies the U.S. pursues will have 
differential impacts on the Pacific Basin economies. Large-scale 
broad-based, or even relatively focussed, protectionist legislation will 
hit Pacific Basin economies disproportionately since they are the major 
source of textile and other labor intensive manufactures imports. The 
great fear among the Pacific Basin economies is that the U.S. will 
substantially and pervasively close its markets. That would hurt in 
every way possible macro, micro, and systemic. It would force either a 
rethinking of export-led development strategies, or the forging of far 
closer ties with Japan in informal or formal regional bloc arrangements. 
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On the other hand, further dollar depreciation will benefit the 
Pacific Basin economies since their currencies are tied to the dollar. 
Their exports to the U.S. would not be hurt and would even increase in 
substitution for Japanese exports to the U.S., and exports to Japan 
would rise as the yen appreciated. Indeed this process is already well 
underway. To the extent that the Pacific Basin economies increase their 
imports coinmensurate with export increases, they, the U.S. and the world 
are better off. By and large this is what happens. The major exception 
is Taiwan which has been running major excessive current account sur-
pluses; it will be under increasing pressure both to appreciate its 
exchange rate and to liberalize imports. South Korea too since 1986 is 
now running a current account surplus for the first time. Since the 
nation's foreign debt is large, a moderate current account surplus 
combined with import liberalization is appropriate. The problem for the 
U.S. is that the dollar must decline on a trade-weighted basis not simply 
vis a vis the yen. To the extent that production shifts from Japan to 
Pacific Basin economies tied to the dollar, then the beneficial relative 
price effect on the U.S. trade deficit will not occur. 
The most clear-cut spillover effects on the Pacific Basin economies 
lie special U.S.-Japan bilateral deals restricting Japanese producer 
access to the U.S. market. In the short run other Pacific Basin economies 
benefit to the degree to which they have, or can develop, competitive 
production capacity in the restricted products. In the longer run, 
however, their very success generates U.S. reaction: an extension of the 
specific bilateral import restrictions to them as well. The most out-
standing case is, of course, textiles; the MFA restrains the textile 
exports of all the Pacific Basin economies to the U.S. and to the 
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European Community as well. The orderly marketing agreement on color 
television soon had to be expanded to South Korea, Taiwan, and Hong 
Kong. U.S. steel restrictions were from the beginning more broadly 
based, focussing as much on European dumping as Japanese cost efficiency. 
The most recent import restrictions have set VERs for South Korea and 
Taiwan as well as Japan. The 1980s U.S.-Japan bilateral restrictive 
arrangements in automobiles and semiconductors have accelerated pro-
duction in and exports from Korea, thus far without retaliation. The 
more technologically sophisticated and larger the minimum efficient 
production scale, the slower will be the process of substitution to other 
Pacific Basin economies. 
In the longer run, the Pacific Basin economies have to confront the 
two alternative models Japan and the United States pose: the GATT-based 
multilateral system; or managed trade in major sectors through the 
expansion of bilaterally-based specific sector import restrictions to 
all the Pacific Basin economies and indeed to the world. In the systemic 
context, this is what the Uruguay Round is all about. If the Round fails, 
then a broad retreat into sectoral, or possibly regional, protectionism 
is highly likely. The Pacific Basin economies, in their urging of and 
support for the Uruguay Round have already indicated their preference 
for an open, multilateral, non-discriminatory system. Given the 
political realities of the time, and the lack of leadership in Japan or 
the United States to implement a true free trade vision in practice as 
well as rhetoric, then the likely outcome is for modest success in the 
Uruguay Round, continuing inability to resolve structural adjustment 
problems very constructively, and a continuation of the creep toward 
sectoral protectionism. 
Table 1 
United States and Japan, Balance of Payments Surplus or Deficit 
and Government Budget Deficit, 1970-1986 
(amounts in billion dollars) 
o 
^ Table 2 
Industries 
(A) Market Access to Japan 
Major Industry Specific Trade Issues Between U.S. and Japan in 1985 and 1986 
Issues and Agreements 
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Endnotes 
1. I follow conventional classifications in defining the Pacific Basin 
region as comprising three categories of economies: the advanced 
industrial economies of the United States, Japan, Canada, Australia, 
and New Zealand; the eight or so major Asian developing market 
economies (ADMEs) of South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore 
(the Asian NICs), and Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, and the 
Philippines, plus Brunei (the resource-rich ASEAN members other than 
Singapore); and China (an increasingly open, socialist economy). This 
discussion abstracts from the U.S.-Canada trade relationship, focussing 
on the economies of the Western Pacific. See also Hugh Patrick, 
"The Burgeoning American Economic Stake in the Pacific Basin", in 
James W. Morley, ed., The Pacific Basin — New Challenges for the 
United States (New York: The Academy of Political Science, 1986. 
2. The companion piece by Lawrence Krause, "Financial Issues between 
Japan and the United States," nicely addresses these issues in a 
macro, systemic framework. 
3. Bergsten and Cline estimate that if Japan were to remove completely 
its remaining trade barriers U.S. exports would increase by some 
$5-8 billion — not insignificant but not the solution to the overall 
imbalance problem. See C. Fred Bergsten and William R. Cline, 
The United States-Japan Economic Problem (Washington: Institute for 
International Economics, revised edition, January 1987), p. 114. 
4. The share of manufactures in Japan's total imports rose sharply from 
30.5% in September 1985 to 47.7% in October 1986; while part was 
due to a decline in the price of oil, nonetheless the share of manu-
factures in non-oil imports rose some 12.5 percentage points. Much 
was textiles and other labor-intensive goods imported from Japan's 
Pacific Basin neighbors. More generally in 1986 Japan's export 
volume declined 1.2% and import volume increased by 12.9%. In 
value terms Japan's current account surplus increased by $38 
billion, and Y27 trillion; in yen values exports decreased by 16.6% 
and imports by 32.0%, due particularly to the sharp drop in oil 
prices. It might be noted that between 1981-86 U.S.exports to 
Japan increased by 23%, but to the world as a whole decreased by 10%. 
5. The respective U.S. and Japanese trade change flows are heuristic 
guestimates rather than based on substantial and careful analysis; 
they are given here to indicate orders of magnitude. Note that 
the reductions in current account imbalances will be less than 
trade imbalances since the U.S. will be increasing its interest 
and dividend payments and Japan its receipts. The longer-run 
implications of trade patterns and imbalances as a result of the 
respective changes in net debtor and creditor positions is not 
addressed here in any detail; see the general statement on page 5. 
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6. A few American industries would benefit, where their price-
elasticity and capacity to supply is greater than non-Japanese 
foreign producers. Certain automobile lines are quantitatively 
the most important potential case; however past experience suggests 
U.S. firms are likely to raise prices more than output and obtain 
windfall profits. This is an inequitable and inefficient way to 
increase savings in the United States (to the degree the profits 
are saved, directly or indirectly), and the macro savings and 
employment effects would probably be small. More important in 
car trade within two years will be the huge increase in Japanese 
cars produced in the United States and Canada. 
7. The overvaluation estimate is from Krause, 0£ cit; it is the 
February 1985 peak relative to the 1980 value. There are at 
least three reasons why the dollar will have to decline below 
its earlier competitive equilibrium rate to achieve at current 
account equilibrium (at, say, 1980 levels): the huge interest 
payments deficit will have to be covered by greater increase 
in exports, as already noted; once foreign firms have 
invested in and established market shares and distribution 
networks in the U.S. they will be more difficult to dislodge 
(hysterisis argument); and the U.S. will have to overcome the 
increases in cost competitive industrial capacity in the rest of 
the world (particularly in the Pacific Basin and other NICs). 
8. The 1987 (post-Tokyo Round) average tariffs on a trade-weighted 
basis (using 1976 trade for the weights as were used in the 
Tokyo Round negotiations) are 6.2% for Japan and 3.3% for the 
U.S. However, Japanese tariffs are high on agricultural and 
foreign products; on industrial products the average Japanese 
tariff is 2.3%, the U.S. 4.3%. Quotas and other official non-
tariff barriers are applied to 12% of Japan's trade, 43% of 
U.S. trade (remember textiles, automobiles, steel); however, 
these UNCTAD-based measures are crude. Gary R. Saxonhouse 
and Robert M. Stern, "An Analytical Survey of Formal and 
Informal Barriers to International Trade and Investment in 
the United States, Canada, and Japan", presented to Confer-
ence on U.S.-Canadian Trade and Investment Relations with 
Japan, Ann Arbor, Michigan, April 2-3, 1987, Tables 2 and 3 
and footnote 4. 
9. Saxonhouse and Stern, ibid, evaluates studies by Balassa, 
Bergsten and Cline, Learner, Noland, Saxonhouse, and Staiger 
et al. These studies ask whether Japan is distinctively more 
protectionist than other countries; the norm is the average 
level of protection, not free trade (which no country attains 
in practice). Only Balassafs study indicates Japan is an out-
lier among the industrial nations; however his transportation 
cost measure is seriously flawed, and the results are skewed by 
the fact that the European nations trade so much with each other. 
10. National security increases offset U.S.-Japanese trade in other 
strategic sectors as well, notably agriculture and energy. Japan 
has used increasingly a national security argument to justify 
inefficient domestic agricultural production once the United 
States indicated it is a highly but not absolutely reliable 
supplier; stockpiling and geographic diversification of sources 
make more sense, however. The U.S. prohibits the export of oil, 
which is of bilateral significance given the location of Alaskan 
oil which ends up being shipped to the Eastern part of the United 
States. 
11. I do not attempt here to review GATT and its problems or the 
current (Uruguay) Round of negotiations just underway, in any 
detail. Accordingly, many issues important to the Pacific Basin, 
such as the generalized system of preferences or conditionality, 
are not treated since they are not central to the U.S.-Japan 
relationship. 
12. Ironically, if the United States had maintained a current account 
balance of essentially zero in the 1980s, as it averaged in the 
1970s, Japan would have had a smaller but still substantial current 
surplus of perhaps $25-$30 billion — and would probably be praised 
for lending its savings, directly or indirectly, to the Third 
World. 
13. Such quantitative estimates have to be treated with caution, 
since typically they are weighted by actual trade amounts rather 
than simply a listing of the number of items. Thus a very 
restrictive system would prohibit imports entirely and would not 
enter the estimates, while a system of only modest restriction would 
allow substantial imports (e.g., automobiles) and raise the estimate 
of restriction. 
14. These quotas do not yet apply to textile trade among the developed 
countries, though current U.S. legislative proposals do contain 
such provisions. Japan is the only advanced industrial country 
not to apply the MFA quotas; however, its textile imports in-
creased rapidly in 1986 and it is apparently negotiating voluntary 
export restraints (VERs) with South Korea and Taiwan. 
15. The U.S. action on April 18, 1987 of applying focussed prohobitive 
tariffs to imports of selected items produced by Japanese companies 
which also produce semiconductors as retaliation for alleged non-
conformity to the 1986 semiconductor agreement may become an import-
ant variant in retaliation instruments, in at least two respects: 
it was applied without presentation of evidence of Japanese non-
compliance and of estimation of trade affected; and it was evidently 
targetted specifically at major Japanese semiconductor producers 
even though its impact is on a wider range of companies such as 
Matsushita, Sharp, Epsom, and in power tools Makita and Ryobi as 
well as Hitachi. New York Times, April 18, 1987, p. 31. 
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16. This crucially depends on the political and administrative 
capacity of the U.S. Government to develop and implement 
efficient industry-specific programs based on market-conforming 
competitiveness criteria for structural adjustment. This, 
however, is an open question. See Hugh Patrick, "Reflections 
on U.S. Industrial Policy for Troubled Industries, in Light of 
Japanese Experience" (draft, April 1987). 
17. The only exception of which I am aware has been Japan's imposition 
of import quotas (VERs?) on raw silk and silk thread from South 
Korea, China, and Thailand •— a quantitatively small trade item. 
